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The aim of this paper is to study whether schooling choices are affected by social interactions. 
Such social interactions may be important because children enjoy spending time with other 
children or parents learn from other parents about the ability of their children. Identification is 
based on a randomized intervention that grants a cash subsidy encouraging school attendance 
among a sub-group of eligible children within small rural villages in Mexico. Results indicate 
that (i) the eligible children tend to attend school more frequently, (ii) but also the ineligible 
children acquire more schooling when the subsidy is introduced in their local village, (iii) 
social interactions are economically important, and (iv) they may arise due to changes in 
parents’ perception of their children’s ability. 
JEL Code: C93, I21, I28. 
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”Curiously enough, when one of the students would get sick, one or two of his
closest friends would also not show up to school.” – School principal in a rural
school in Mexico (Adato et al., 2000, p. 54)
All social sciences agree that education is very important in every person’s life. Under-
standing when and why children leave school for work is thus crucial. Economists have been
quite successful in developing a framework that explains schooling decisions (Becker, 1964).
Yet, while economists have typically focused on the individual costs and beneﬁts of acquir-
ing further schooling (Card, 1999), sociologists have long pointed out that schooling decisions
could be aﬀected by the social environment of a child (Coleman, 1961). Speciﬁcally, children
meet their friends at school and the school can be important in shaping a child’s identity.1
Likewise, school meetings are the most important setting where parents interact with other
parents to share information regarding their child’s ability, and the potential beneﬁts costs of
schooling.2
This paper aims to provide evidence of the importance of the social determinants of school-
ing among children enrolled in the upper grades of primary school in rural Mexico. A com-
prehensive understanding of the factors shaping education investment decisions is particularly
needed in this setting. Children are often absent from school and many leave school when
they complete primary school at the age of 12 years – notably two years before they reach
the minimum age required for employment. To address these schooling problems, the Mexican
ministry of education devised in the late 1990s an innovative program – the PROGRESA pro-
gram – designed to encourage school attendance among poor families living in small villages
in rural Mexico. The program consists of a cash grant paid to the mother for each child in
grade 3-6 of primary school or grade 1-3 of secondary school who attends school regularly, i.e.
more than 85 % of all school days during every 2 month period of the school year. Clearly, this
program directly increases the incentive to attend school among eligible children, i.e. children
living in households that are classiﬁed as poor. Indeed, the existing evidence indicates that
this program is highly successful in increasing primary and secondary school attendance rates
by around 6-10 percentage points.3
The basic idea of this paper is to assess the response of the ineligible children – living in a
1See Akerlof and Kranton (2002) for a model that discusses how identity aﬀects the economics of education.
2See Manski (2004) for a recent theoretical discussion of social learning.
3See Behrman et al. (2001), Buddelmeyer and Skouﬁas (2003), and Attanasio et al. (2003) for evaluations of
this program.
1household that has not been classiﬁed as poor – to introducing the program in their peer group.
Clearly, these children’s families do not receive additional income when they send their child to
school. However, these children might want to spend more time in the classroom because their
peers – children in the same grade living in the same village – attend school more frequently.
Also, parents might perceive the expected gain to acquiring schooling to have increased when
they see that other parents send their children to school. Thus, the spillover eﬀect of the
program on the ineligible children can be used to measure the role of social interactions in
schooling decisions (Moﬃtt, 2001).
Identifying social interactions is diﬃcult because individuals tend to select into similar
groups – an ”omitted variable” problem – and because if the group is aﬀecting the individual
the reverse is also true – the ”reﬂection problem” (Manski, 1993).4 PROGRESA is ideally
suited to address these two important identiﬁcation problems. First, the program was ran-
domly implemented. Randomization balances all determinants of school attendance directly
addressing the ”omitted variable” problem. The ”reﬂection problem” can be solved because
PROGRESA grants are only paid to a sub-group of eligible children within small villages.
Thus, PROGRESA increases peer group school attendance while leaving unaﬀected the in-
eligible child’s monetary incentive to attend school.5 This means that the response among
ineligible children provides information on how strongly the peer group aﬀects the individual
and not vice versa.
Our empirical results conﬁrm previous ﬁndings of a sizeable eﬀect of schooling subsidies on
school attendance among eligible children. With regard to social interactions, we ﬁnd, ﬁrst,
that there is a positive and statistically signiﬁcant average spillover eﬀect of the program on
mphineligible children. We also ﬁnd that the ineligible child’s response is larger the higher is
the eligible fraction of children among their classroom peers. Second, the social interaction
eﬀect is sizeable. When we combine the response of the ineligible student with information
on the eﬀect of PROGRESA on peer group schooling, we ﬁnd that the ineligible students’
schooling decisions are strongly, and statistically signiﬁcantly, aﬀected by their peer’s decision.
There is a 1 percentage point increase in school attendance for every 2 percentage point increase
in schooling among peers. Third, we ﬁnd that the direct eﬀect of the cash subsidy on school
attendance is about as large as the social spillover eﬀect among children from poor households.
4Manski (1993) called this the ”reﬂection problem” because solving it is analogous to determining whether
the mirror image is causing me to act like I do or vice versa. Also see the more recent discussions in Manski
(1995) and Manski (2000) on the identiﬁcation problems with endogenous social interactions.
5The ineligible children might be aﬀected indirectly by the program if the poor share their grants with the
non-poor. However, there is no evidence of direct sharing of the beneﬁts. Furthermore, the poor appear to have
used PROGRESA transfers to cover schooling costs (school material and transportation) or purchase children’s
clothes. Only about 20 out of the 506 villages have local markets where children clothes are sold. This means
that the additional income of the poor is unlikely to have altered income among the non-poor.
2Thus, the average total eﬀect of PROGRESA on eligible children can be explained via both
the direct eﬀect of the subsidy on the individual and the indirect eﬀect of the subsidy on the
social environment of poor children. Decomposing the total eﬀect of a targeted intervention is
crucial when thinking about targeting of programs. If the indirect eﬀect is small, targeting does
not matter for the size of the total eﬀect. If the indirect eﬀect is large, targeting matters. A
program that is spread out over a few people living in many villages generates smaller average
eﬀects on the eligible population than a program that targets all individuals living in a few
villages.
From a policy point of view it is crucial to understand the reasons for these endogenous
social interactions (Manski, 2000). If these interactions arise because parents learn from other
parents about the value of schooling for their child, policy could also consider alternative
interventions to increase schooling in rural Mexico. On the other hand, if children simply like to
spend time with their classmates, such interventions will not work. Interestingly, PROGRESA
allows us to go one step towards understanding endogenous social interactions in rural Mexico.
After the program was introduced, parents were asked about the highest level of schooling they
believe that their child is able to reach. Analyzing this subjective measure of a child’s ability we
ﬁnd that PROGRESA increases parents’ subjective evaluation of the ability of their children.
This ﬁnding supports the idea that at least to some extent endogenous social interactions arise
because parents’ perceptions of child ability are shaped by the social environment.
Our ﬁndings are important for at least four reasons. First, these ﬁndings suggest that the
social environment is relevant in aﬀecting one of the most important investment decisions.
This implies that economists should pay attention to social interactions in analyzing schooling
choices both theoretically and empirically. Second, endogenous social interactions in school-
ing decisions entail ampliﬁcation of the eﬀects of schooling interventions because endogenous
social interactions give rise to a social multiplier (Glaeser et al., 2003). Third, evidence on
the quantitative importance of social interactions is essential in thinking about targeting of
this program. PROGRESA was set up to target poor households. If social interactions are
important, the average eﬀect of the program on the poor is larger if many other poor house-
holds within the same village are eligible for the program. Fourth, our ﬁndings that social
interactions arise due to learning interactions suggest that it is possible to consider alternative
interventions that increase schooling in rural Mexico.
There is a rapidly expanding literature on social interactions in schooling.6 There is a ﬁrst
important strand of the literature that addresses the ”omitted variable problem” using panel
6See Glaeser et al. (1996) on social interaction in crime, and Lalive (2003), Topa (2001), and Topa and
Conley (2002) for social interaction in unemployment.
3data. Hoxby (2000) identiﬁes peer eﬀects from gender and race variation. Sacerdote (2001)
studies peer eﬀects among college freshman at Dartmouth college who are assigned to dorms at
random. Hanushek et al. (2001) study how peer ability aﬀects student achievement. Betts and
Zau (2004) use administrative data to study peer groups and academic achievement. However,
while these studies address the ”omitted variable bias”, using panel data does not address
the ”reﬂection problem”. The earliest study that address the reﬂection problem is Case and
Katz (1991) who use instrumental variables to study neighborhood eﬀects in the Boston area.
Duﬂo and Saez (2003) study the role of information and social interactions in retirement plan
decisions in a ﬁeld experiment. Angrist and Lang (2004) measure peer eﬀects in academic
achievement using quasi-experimental features in the placement of disadvantaged children in a
Boston desegregation program. Miguel et al. (2004) study a merit-based incentive program in
Kenya that generates strong eﬀects among eligible girls but also spillover eﬀects on ineligible
boys.7
The paper that is closest to ours is Bobonis and Finan (2005) who study social interactions
in schooling decisions using PROGRESA limiting the analysis to children having completed
primary education. This paper complements the analysis in Bobonis and Finan (2005) in
at least three important ways. First, this paper focuses on both children who are still in
primary school and on children facing the transition from primary to secondary school. This
is important because the aim of the PROGRESA program is not only to increase secondary
school enrollment but also school attendance in primary school. Thus, the analysis of this
paper provides a comprehensive understanding of the relevance of social interactions. Second,
this paper discusses how to use both the program status of a village (with program or without
program) as well as the (pre-determined) composition of the peer group as instruments of
average peer group schooling. Using both pieces of information instead of just the program
status of the village is critical because endogenous social interactions can be identiﬁed more
convincingly using only within village information on peer groups and individuals. Third, to
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that uses subjective information on parents’ perception
of children’s ability to understand the reasons for endogenous social interactions in schooling
decisions.8
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background information on Mexico
and PROGRESA. Section 3 discusses the data and presents descriptive evidence. Section
4 discusses the identiﬁcation strategy. Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6
7A related issue arises in studying the impacts of de-worming treatment in developing countries. Miguel and
Kremer (2004) ﬁnd strong epidemiological spillovers generated by de-worming treatment in rural Kenya.
8See Munshi and Myaux (2006) for a paper that explains why there are social interactions in fertility.
4concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Primary and Secondary Education in Mexico
According to the general education act from 1993 the educational system in Mexico comprises
3 levels: basic, which is sub-classiﬁed in pre-primary, primary and lower secondary; upper
secondary and tertiary. However the only two types that are obligatory for all Mexican citizens
according to the Mexican political constitution are primary and lower secondary school. The
Mexican school system is quite centralized. Schools have limited decision-making autonomy,
with only 22 % of all decisions taken at the school level, 45 % of all decisions taken at the state
level and 30 % taken at the central level (OECD, 2004).
Whereas Mexico has made substantial progress in terms of average educational attainment,
there is still a strong discrepancy in terms of education attainment between rural and central
areas (Hanson, 2002). This is because many rural villages have a local primary school but
the secondary schools are only present in larger villages or small cities. Thus, distance to
secondary school is an important factor explaining low educational attainment. Distance to
school is perceived to be particularly problematic and dangerous for girls (Adato et al., 2000,
p. 73). Also, poor families simply can not aﬀord to send all children to primary and secondary
school. Moreover, children do not want to continue with school due to laziness, boredom with
school and preference for work, girls would rather be with their boyfriend than in school,
teachers treat children badly, children want their own income rather than study (Adato et al.,
2000, p. 72). After school, most children in rural areas are expected to perform a variety of
household chores such as taking care of animals, help out in the kitchen, gather ﬁrewood, help
out in building a fence, etc. These tasks are demanding and require balancing the schoolwork
and the housework schedules (Adato et al., 2000, p. 66).
2.2 PROGRESA
In order to encourage enrollment and permanence in school of children and teenagers under
18 years old who attend grades between third of primary and third of secondary the Mexican
government created PROGRESA (Programa de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion)9 which is
a program aimed at increasing the opportunities and complementing the income of Mexican
families living in conditions of extreme poverty. It has three components: education, health
9The Program was re-named Oportunidades under the Fox administration.
5and nutrition. PROGRESA’s health and nutrition components primarily target children aged
0-60 months (Gertler, 2004). Other family members visit clinics once a year for checkups and
receive information concerning health prevention and nutrition at monthly meetings (pl´ aticas).
PROGRESA’s educational component consists of cash transfers which are provided to poor
families every two months during the school year (August to June) conditional on sending
their children to school. The cash grants have two particularities: the sums granted increase
as children reach higher grades and – in the secondary school – the sums awarded to girls are
slightly higher than those for boys to compensate for the slightly higher proportion of girls
dropping out of school (Table A1).10 The nominal values of the cash transfers are adjusted
every 6 months to take into account changes in cost of living. The cash subsidy is handed
out to the mother because of the belief that the mother is usually better administrating the
household resources and because women are disproportionately vulnerable to poverty. The
grants are awarded only after conﬁrming that the child has been present on more than 85%
of all school days in successive bi-monthly periods during the school year. If they fail to fulﬁll
this requirement they loose the grant, at ﬁrst temporarily and then permanently. Attendance
is monitored by school teachers. There are only very few reports of parents trying to inﬂuence
teachers to misreport attendance (Adato et al., 2000). The PROGRESA transfers go directly
from the Federal Budget to beneﬁciary households.
The most important advantage of this program from the perspective of this paper is that
PROGRESA is a partial-population intervention that was phased-in at random.11 Speciﬁcally,
the program was implemented in three steps. In the ﬁrst step, the Mexican government selected
an initial set of 506 rural villages which are characterized by a high degree of ”marginality”, but
with access to education and health facilities, on the basis of the 1990 and 1995 census.12 These
506 villages are located in seven states (Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoac´ an, Puebla, Quer´ etaro, San
Luis Potos´ ı and Veracruz) which are loosely clustered around Mexico City.
In the second step, PROGRESA determined the poverty status of each of about 24,000
households living in these 506 villages based on survey information collected in October 1997.
Basically, the poverty status of the household was determined using information on educational
attainment of the household head and her or his partner, dwelling characteristics, and other
information that predicts the per capita household income. The poverty status of a household
was determined by condensing this information into a so-called ”poverty index”. A household
10Beneﬁciary families also receive funding to pay for school material of 135 pesos for children in primary
school and 170 pesos for children in secondary school.
11See Skouﬁas (2001) for an in-depth discussion of the implementation of the program.
12The marginality index compresses information on literacy, share of dwellings without water, drainage or
electricity, average number of occupants in one room, share of dwellings with dirt ﬂoor, and share of population
working in primary sector into one variable by means of a principal components analysis.
6was classiﬁed as poor if its poverty index exceeded a state speciﬁc poverty threshold. On
average, this procedure led to 52 % of all households being classiﬁed as poor but there is also
substantial variation with respect to the percentage of households that are eligible within a
village.
In a third step, PROGRESA determined at random a set of 320 villages where the program
was implemented as of August 1998. The remaining 186 villages were excluded from the list of
PROGRESA villages until the end of the 1999 / 2000 school year. This randomized phasing-in
of the program allows evaluating the impacts of PROGRESA in a randomized design.13
In the second year of the program, (August 1999 to June 2000), PROGRESA added a
further 26 % of all household to the list of beneﬁciaries due to complaints that the initial
procedure discriminated against households whose children had already left home. However,
by the year 2000, PROGRESA staﬀ found that none of the newly admitted households had
collected any cash beneﬁts. Apparently, none of the newly admitted households had been
notiﬁed of their eligibility for the program (Buddelmeyer and Skouﬁas, 2003). Because an
in-depth understanding of how the program was implemented is crucial but missing, we limit
all analyses to the ﬁrst year of the program.
2.3 Social Interactions
The basic idea of this paper is that children from non-poor households also might decide to stay
in school longer when PROGRESA leads children from poor households within their village to
stay in school longer. What are the likely reasons for this? There are two possible explanations.
First, children like to spend time with their friends as the statement by the school director
cited in the introduction clearly shows. Thus, when prior to PROGRESA a child from a poor
household reported sick and some of his or her friends from non-poor households curiously also
missed school, the non-poor children now have no reason to miss school when all children from
poor households attend school regularly.
Second, there can also be social spillovers on non-beneﬁciary parents due to the program.
Suppose PROGRESA changes the way parents from beneﬁciary household evaluate the career
prospects of their children. This could happen for a number of reasons. On one hand, bene-
ﬁciary parents frequently interact with highly educated program staﬀ and doctors potentially
informing them of the beneﬁts of acquiring further education. On the other hand, since ben-
eﬁciary children are attending school more regularly teachers might be more optimistic about
the educational career prospects of a beneﬁciary child. How can beneﬁciary optimism spill
13Randomized evaluation proved crucial in securing a loan from the World Bank to roll out the program in
all of Mexico in 2000.
7over to non-beneﬁciary parents? Parents tend to have a more precise notion of the ability of
their child relative to other children’s ability rather than the absolute ability of their child. If
that is true, non-beneﬁciary parents will be more optimistic regarding the educational career
prospects of their children when other parents’ evaluation of their children’s ability increases.
Clearly, such social interactions are expected to be strong among children who have reached
the same grade level and who are living in the same village. These children are likely to be
classmates because most villages are so small that they only have one local school. Moreover,
parents will be aﬀected strongly by their child’s classmates parents because they tend to meet
these parents more frequently than parents of other children who are not in the same grade at
school meetings. Thus, it is likely that the relevant peer group consists of all children living in
the same village who have reached the same grade level.
Is this program useful in identifying social interactions between poor and non-poor families?
If children from poor households only interact with other children from poor households, there
could be important social spillover eﬀects that can not be detected with the PROGRESA
experiment. However, any social interactions that we ﬁnd can be thought to represent a
lower bound on within poor / within non-poor social interactions. Moreover, there is strong
evidence that the inhabitants of the 506 rural and extremely poor villages in Mexico felt that
the selection of poor families was quite arbitrary.14 This suggests that social relationships
exists also between the poor and the non-poor. Moreover, the fact that the program was
implemented did not seem to change existing social relationships.15
2.4 Confounding Eﬀects
It is essential to discuss alternative hypotheses that motivate a spillover eﬀect on the children
living from ineligible households. It might, ﬁrst, be possible that poor households share the
education grants with non-poor households. In the oﬃcial evaluation Adato et al. (2000) and
Bobonis and Finan (2005) do not ﬁnd sharing of beneﬁts to any substantial extent. This is
probably due to the fact that the transfers are not perceived as salient. According to in-depth
focus group research, these beneﬁts are helpful in ﬁnancing a child’s education but they do not
pay for much else (Adato et al., 2000).
Second, even if the poor do not share the grants directly with the non-poor, they might
spend the additional income in shops owned by the non-poor thus also directly aﬀecting the
incomes of the non-poor. The existing evidence shows that the transfers are mainly used to
14”Among beneﬁciaries, non-beneﬁciaries and promotoras, there was a strong view expressed that ’everyone
is poor’ – a sense of common identity in poverty.” (Adato, 2000, p. vi)
15”Many comments were made suggesting that beneﬁciaries and non-beneﬁciaries continue to get along with
each other ﬁne and ’the same’ as before.” (Adato, 2000, p. vi)
8ﬁnance the children’s education and clothes for children (Bobonis, 2004). Detailed village level
data suggests that the grants are spent outside the village rather than in the local village. Only
20 out of the 506 villages have a local supermarket or street market. Nevertheless, it is possible
to investigate whether there are indirect eﬀects of PROGRESA on the non-poor households.
Angelucci and De Giorgi (2006) ﬁnd that consumption of the non-poor also increases as a
response to introducing the program. This eﬀect only arises in the second year of the program.
Analyzing this second year is diﬃcult for two reasons. On one hand PROGRESA staﬀ extended
eligibility between the ﬁrst and the second year. On the other hand, Buddelmeyer and Skouﬁas
(2003) report that most of the newly admitted households never claimed PROGRESA beneﬁts.
Thus, it is not clear how this extension of PROGRESA was communicated and enacted. The
analysis of this paper therefore focuses exclusively on the ﬁrst year of the program. Moreover,
we will use the detailed consumption information compiled by Angelucci and De Giorgi (2006)
to identify social interactions conditional on household consumption to assess the robustness
of our estimates in a sensitivity analysis.16
Third, it might be that the non-poor misunderstood the working of the program and
believed that they are eligible as well. This is unlikely to be the case. Between October 1997
and the start of the program in August 1998, PROGRESA held public meetings in which
the eligibility status of each household was clearly communicated. Moreover, the education
subsidy was administered using two forms. The E1 form recorded background information on
all children from eligible household. These E1 forms were the basis of the E2 form, a list of
eligible children, which was sent out to each school which is attended by eligible children. The
E1 forms were not distributed to non-beneﬁciary households.
Fourth, ineligible children may also have attended school more regularly due to increases
in the quality of teaching, or the quality of schools. However, in their in-depth evaluation of
PROGRESA, Adato et al. (2000) do not ﬁnd any change in terms of the overall quality of
education in PROGRESA villages compared to control communities. In PROGRESA villages,
54.9 % of all school directors state that the overall conditions of the school has improved since
PROGRESA started. In control villages, the corresponding ﬁgure is 9 percentage points higher
(63.9 %) motivating a concern with underestimation of the spillover eﬀect.
16Theoretically, a spillover eﬀect on ineligible children’s school attendance could also be due to a health
spillover when the incidence of communicable diseases is reduced among beneﬁciary children (Miguel and Kre-
mer, 2004). However, (Gertler, 2000) does not ﬁnd an eﬀect of PROGRESA on health among beneﬁciary
children aged 6-17 years. This suggests that health spillovers can not explain a potential school attendance
spillover eﬀect.
93 Data and Descriptive Evidence
3.1 Data
The oﬃcial PROGRESA evaluation database contains annual survey information on school
attendance, socio-economic characteristics, and localities between October 1997 and November
1999.17 The empirical analysis primarily uses information on two waves, October 1997 and
October 1998. The ﬁrst wave provides information on school attendance and socio-economic
background before the program was implemented. The second wave is useful in assessing the
eﬀect of the program because the program was implemented in August 1998.
We concentrate on children living with their mother who have completed grades 3 to 6
of primary school in October 1997.18 This sample consists of children from poor households
whose family directly became eligible when PROGRESA was introduced, and children from
non-poor households whose family did not become eligible in August 1998 but who are expected
to know eligible children in their classroom and village. Moreover, this sample covers children
who have not yet ﬁnished primary school (children having completed grades 3 and 4 of primary
school) as well as children making the transition from primary school to secondary school or
drop out of school (children having completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school). Thus, the
sample allows discussing whether social interactions are relevant in attendance and drop-out
decisions. Second, we concentrate on children aged 6 to 16 years in October 1998 because the
outcome indicator – school attendance – was only collected for children in this age group. We
end up with a sample of 15,653 children of which 9,690 live in ”treated” villages – where the
program was implemented in August 1998 – and 5,963 live in ”control” villages that were denied
access to the program in August 1998. Note that this sample comprises both children who are
still enrolled in school as well as children who have already left school either temporarily or
permanently. This is advantageous since our focus is to study the eﬀect of social interactions on
overall schooling decisions. Moreover, the data indicate that temporary school exists are quite
common, especially among children who have completed primary school. Thus, non-enrollment
17To our knowledge, the administrative data generated in paying out the subsidy is not available for re-
searchers. PROGRESA also collected information during the spring. The number of completed interviews in
the spring is, however, 20 % lower than in the fall. This likely reﬂects the seasonal pattern of ﬁeld work in the
villages. Since non-response may be non-random, we focus on the interviews conducted in the fall rather than
in spring.
18The sample selection can not be based on the grade attained in October 1998 because grade attainment in
1998 is already aﬀected by PROGRESA and, therefore, endogenous. Grade attained in 1997 is also determined
by a number of factors we do not observe. However, randomized implementation of the program ensures that
grade attainment is the same in PROGRESA villages and control villages. Moreover, this criterion rules out
children who have completed grades 1-3 of secondary school in the year prior to the start of the program.
However, note that (i) for many of these children we have no information on school attendance in October 1998
(this item is only available for children aged 6-16), and (ii) many villages do not have a local secondary school
– implying that the children in the local village are only a part of the social network.
10in a particular year is not an indicator of permanent school exit.
3.2 Descriptive Evidence
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the background characteristics of the children in the
sample. Panel A in Table 1 reports statistics for the 10,484 children living in poor households.
The distribution of children across grades is slightly skewed to the right. The fraction of
children having completed grades 3, 4, and 5 is about 6 percentage points lower than the
fraction of children having completed grade 6. This is due to the fact that some children for
whom the highest grade attained is the sixth grade in primary school have already left the
education system. Parental education – a powerful predictor of household income – is very
poor.19 Roughly 16 percent of all children have a mother or father who has completed primary
school, i.e. has reached grade 6 of primary school or a higher grade level.20 Children in poor
households also do not tend to live in dwellings with a cement ﬂoor or ﬁrm roof. (The omitted
categories concerning the roof type refer to roofs made of cardboard or palm leaves.) Whereas
all villages have a local primary school, many villages do not have a local secondary school.
Thus, the costs of attending secondary school are large and the incentive to ﬁnish primary
school is weak.
Table 1 about here
Comparing Panel A and Panel B in Table 1 allows to infer to what extent our proxies
for household income predict poverty status of the household. There is strong evidence that
poverty status is related to parental education, and dwelling characteristics. The percentage of
children with a mother having completed primary education is about 16 percent among poor
children (Panel A), and 22 percent among non-poor children (Panel B). Father primary school
completion follows a similar pattern. With respect to dwelling characteristics, we ﬁnd that
whereas only about 25 percent of all poor children live in a dwelling that has a cement ﬂoor
(as opposed to a dirt ﬂoor), the corresponding ﬁgure is roughly 60 percent among non-poor
children. The fraction of children living in a dwelling with a permanent roof type is much higher
among non-poor children than among poor children. There is also an interesting diﬀerence
between poor and non-poor children with respect to grade. We ﬁnd that the fraction of children
19We have constructed a direct measure of household income. It turns out that this measure does not add to
the empirical analysis we report below. We do not report the constructed household income measure for two
reasons. First, household income is much more likely subject to reporting bias. Second, it is well known that
measuring household income is diﬃcult in agricultural societies due to the importance of home production.
20Note that parental education is aﬀected by non-response. For about 33 percent of all children, there is no
information regarding parental education. Further analysis (not shown) of this fact indicates that non-response
increases strongly with age. This suggests that non-response refers to no schooling at all. Results are not
sensitive to adding an indicator that reﬂects non-response concerning parental education.
11having completed grade 6 is 34 percent among children from non-poor households but only
28 percent among children from poor households. This is consistent with a higher fraction of
children dropping out of school before completing primary school among poor children.
The main result in Table 1, however, is that there is no diﬀerence between villages with
PROGRESA and control villages with respect to any of these important background character-
istics of poor and non-poor children. This suggests that randomization successfully generated
independence between PROGRESA status of the village and observed (and potentially also
unobserved) characteristics. Thus, the eﬀects of PROGRESA on school attendance can be
identiﬁed convincingly because treatment diﬀerences in terms of school attendance are likely
due to implementing the program rather than due to diﬀerences in terms of the average poverty
level.
Table 2 reports descriptive evidence on the eﬀect of the cash subsidy on school attendance.
School attendance is a binary indicator variable taking the value 1 if the child attends school
at the date of the interview, and zero otherwise. School attendance reﬂects both attendance
and enrollment. Panel A in Table 2 reports eﬀects for the eligible children living in poor
households. On average, only about 77 % of all children in grades 3-6 attend school in control
villages in October 1997. In treated villages, school attendance is slightly higher, 78 %, one
year prior to the start of the program. However, the treatment contrast is not signiﬁcant at
any conventional level of signiﬁcance. One year later, in October 1998, school attendance is
69 % in control villages – 8 percentage points lower than the year before. This means that a
substantial fraction of children in our sample have dropped out of school in control villages. In
contrast, in treated villages school attendance is 76 % – only 2 percentage points lower than
the year before. This means that the program increased school attendance by 6 percentage
points – a signiﬁcant impact both in the economic and statistical sense.
Table 2 about here
Panel B in Table 2 discusses the spillover eﬀect of the cash subsidy on the ineligible children
whose household was not classiﬁed as poor. The idea is that children from non-poor households
in villages with PROGRESA do not receive a cash subsidy but they are living in the same
village as children whose school attendance has been strongly increased. The control villages
provide information on the counterfactual situation without PROGRESA. The data indicate
that school attendance is about 76 % in control villages, and about 78 % in treated villages
about one year before the program was introduced – the treatment contrast being insigniﬁcant.
By October 1998, school attendance has dropped by 7 percentage points in control villages
but only by 5 percentage points for ineligible children in treated villages. Thus, the program
12appears to have reduces school drop out sightly, by 2 percentage points, among ineligible
children. However, this ”spillover” eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Thus, results
in Table 2 indicate that PROGRESA strongly increases schooling for the eligible children
but only very weakly for the ineligible children suggesting weak or no social spillovers of the
program.
Table 3 reports the eﬀect of PROGRESA on poor and non-poor children’s change in school
attendance using linear regression analysis that controls for all the observed characteristics
of children. The change in school attendance is the diﬀerence between the school attendance
indicator between October 1998 and October 1997 for each child. This implies that Table
3 reports a within individual diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis of the eﬀect of PROGRESA on
school attendance. It is advisable to use the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy since evidence in
Table 2 indicates that school attendance levels are slightly higher in treated villages compared
to control villages before the program was implemented. Inference is based on robust standard
errors allowing for clustering at the village level.
Results indicate that there is a statistically signiﬁcant and quantitatively important increase
in school attendance trends among poor children (Table 3 Panel A). Villages with program
experience a 5.8 percentage points weaker downward trend in school attendance compared to
villages without the program. Second, controlling for observed characteristics has virtually no
impact on the estimated eﬀect of PROGRESA among poor children. There is a strong grade
related pattern in school attendance trends. Children who have completed grade 4 are aﬀected
by a slightly higher drop in school attendance than the reference – children who have completed
grade 3. Children in grade 6 (having completed grade 5) experience a 19 percentage points
stronger reduction in school attendance than children in grade 4 (having completed grade 3).
This shows that the decision to leave school is primarily taken in grade 6. Interestingly, upon
primary school completion (children who have completed grade 6) there is a slightly more
favorable trend in school attendance than for children having completed grade 3. A more
detailed analysis (not shown) indicates that there is an equal proportion of students attending
school in October 1997 but not attending school in October 1998 (school leavers) and students
with exactly the reverse pattern (school entrants) among the children who have completed
grade 6. This shows that PROGRESA not only aﬀects those who are currently in school but
also those who do not attended school. In addition to grade level, missing father information
reduces the trend in school attendance and local presence of the secondary school increases the
trend in school attendance. There are no further statistically important determinants of the
13trend in school attendance.21
Table 3 about here
The second column in Table 3 reports results for the non-poor. Implementing PROGRESA
increases the trend in school attendance in villages with program by 2.1 percentage points
compared to the villages without the program. This estimate is slightly higher than the
estimate reported in Table 2, and it is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. The
results concerning the correlation between trends in school attendance are similar among the
non-poor as among the poor, except for grade 6 (not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero), and
missing father information (not signiﬁcant). Moreover, father education status is positively
correlated with the trend in school attendance. Children whose father has completed primary
school tend to have 3.3 percentage points higher change in school attendance.
An interesting ﬁrst result emerges from this discussion. In the context of the PROGRESA
experiment, we not only ﬁnd an eﬀect among eligible children but a weaker eﬀect is also present
among ineligible children. In the following section we discuss how to use information on this
spillover eﬀect to identify endogenous social interactions.
4 Identiﬁcation
4.1 Social Interactions
This section discusses how the preliminary analysis from the previous section can be used to
identify the relevance of social interactions in schooling decisions. Let Si denote the change in
school attendance between October 1997 and October 1998 of child i. Let Pi = 1 if the child
lives in a household classiﬁed as poor by PROGRESA, and Pi = 0 otherwise. Let Ti = 1 if
PROGRESA has been implemented in the village in August 1998, and Ti = 0 otherwise. Let
Sig be the average change in school attendance in the relevant peer group, excluding individual
i. The linear model of social interactions (Manski, 1993) can be used to characterize the trends
in school attendance as follows
Si = α0 + α1Ti + α2Pi + δTi ∗ Pi + γSig + i (1)
There are two salient parameters of interest in equation (1). The parameter γ measures
the extent to which individual change in school attendance is aﬀected by peer group average
21Note, however, that our control variables are important predictors of the level of school attendance. Our
ﬁnding that control variables are weak predictors of trends in school attendance implies that their eﬀects on the
level of schooling are time invariant.
14change in school attendance. The parameter δ measures the direct eﬀect of the schooling
subsidy. This parameter captures the extent to which school attendance trends diﬀer between
the children from poor households in treated villages who are receiving the cash grant from the
counterfactual trend in schooling for such children in control villages. Note that identifying
the extent to which the cash grant changes individual decisions requires controlling for any
change in the social environment Sig, provided that social interactions are relevant, i.e. γ 6= 0.
The remaining parameters in equation (1) capture omitted diﬀerences across regions (α1) and
omitted and actual diﬀerences across poor and non-poor children (α2).
The evidence in Table 3 can be used to illustrate how we can identify the social interactions
parameter γ. Contrasting the change in school attendance among non-poor children in villages
with PROGRESA and control villages measures
E[Si|Ti = 1,Pi = 0] − E[Si|Ti = 0,Pi = 0] = (2)
= α1 + γ ∗ (E[Sig|Ti = 1,Pi = 0] − E[Sig|Ti = 0,Pi = 0])
Equation (2) shows that the treatment contrast among non-poor children reﬂects social
interactions provided that there are no direct changes in villages with program, i.e. α1 = 0.
Let us discuss ﬁrst the sense in which we can learn about social interactions among non-poor
children and then discuss the potential threats to the validity of the identifying assumption.
The spillover among ineligible children is informative on social interactions to the extent that
implementing PROGRESA aﬀects the average change in school attendance in the peer group.
Thus social interactions can only be detected if the cash subsidy program is salient and if
child i is interacting with a peer group which decides to acquire signiﬁcantly more schooling.
With respect to salience, we have shown strong evidence in Table 3 that PROGRESA aﬀects
schooling decisions among children from poor households. Furthermore, about 54 percent
of all children in the peer group of the average non-poor child are from eligible households.
This means that PROGRESA is suited, in principle, to identify social interactions in school
attendance decisions.
With respect to the identifying assumption, note that PROGRESA was randomized over
villages. Randomization will balance all (observed and unobserved) characteristics of villages.
Our analysis, however, is based on the individual school attendance decision. Thus, the ﬁrst
argument questioning the validity of the identifying assumption is that randomization at the
village level may not balance characteristics at the individual level. However, randomization at
the village level also ensures balancing of characteristics as the number of villages increases. The
15PROGRESA program is a very large scale randomized intervention with 506 villages in total.
This suggests that randomization at the village level also successfully achieves independence at
the individual level. Furthermore, the evidence in Table 1 suggests that observed characteristics
are balanced at the individual level. Section 2 has discussed three further concerns with the
identifying assumption: sharing of beneﬁts, income spillovers, and misperceived eligibility
status. A priori, none of these concerns seem warranted. In the empirical analysis, we address
the income spillover and the misclassiﬁcation hypothesis directly.
Equation (2) shows that we can identify γ using the PROGRESA status of a village, Ti,
as an instrument for average trend in schooling in the peer group Sig. As will be shown in
Table 4, the PROGRESA status of a village is a strong predictor of the average trend in school
attendance in the peer group. Moreover, as we have argued above, the PROGRESA status of
a village does not appear to aﬀect individual schooling of the ineligible children directly. We
call the identiﬁcation strategy that uses Ti as an instrument for Sig our ”IV1 strategy”.
Our ”IV2 strategy” recognizes that there is tremendous pre-program variation in the per-
centage of children from poor households within a non-poor child’s peer group. Essentially,
peer groups diﬀer with respect to the eligible fraction because PROGRESA applied the state
poverty line to a set of villages which diﬀer with respect to their location relative to the poverty
line. Clearly, the ”eligible fraction” is an important predictor of the eﬀect of PROGRESA on
peer group schooling.
Moreover, the pre-program eligible fraction in the peer group is exogenous for two reasons.
First, the pre-program composition of peer groups can not be aﬀected by relocation before the
treatment status of the village was determined.22 Second, randomization ensures that villages
with PROGRESA and villages without PROGRESA are balanced with respect to pre-program
composition of peer groups. Indeed, the average eligible fraction in villages with program is .553
– identical to the average eligible fraction in villages without the program of .550. Moreover,
the correlation between pre-program school attendance and the eligible fraction in the peer
group is identical both for villages with program and villages without the program.23
This means that the eligible fraction in the peer group in villages with the program is a
valid instrument for peer group schooling, conditional on the direct eﬀect of the eligible fraction
22Note that using the pre-program (October 1997) eligible fraction rather than the during-program (October
1998) eligible fraction leads to a weaker instrument because the pre-program eligible fraction proxies for during-
program eligible fraction. Arguably, the advantage in terms of the pre-program eligible fraction being exogenous
greatly outweighs this cost.
23We also ﬁnd that the correlation between all the observed characteristics listed in Table 1 is identical in
villages with program and villages without program with the exception of the ”ﬂoor: cement” variable. Children
with a high eligible fraction in PROGRESA villages are more likely to live in dwellings with a cement ﬂoor. The
evidence in Table 3, however, shows that living in a dwelling with a cement ﬂoor does not predict the change in
school attendance. Thus, there is no evidence supporting a direct eﬀect of the eligible fraction in peer groups
due to imbalance with respect to observed characteristics.
16in the peer group on school attendance. We therefore use ”village with program” (Ti) and the
interaction term ”eligible fraction * village WITH program” (Ti∗Pig) to instrument the change
in school attendance in the peer group (Sig) and we enter the ”eligible fraction” as a separate
regressor to all models that apply our ”IV2 strategy”.
There are two important advantages to applying the ”IV2 strategy” rather than the ”IV1
strategy”. First, the ”IV2” estimates are expected to be more precisely estimated than the
”IV1” estimates because the precision of instrumental variables estimates depends on the
predictive power of the instrument. Improving precision is crucial since instrumental variable
estimates are generally characterized by low precision. Second, with the ”IV2” estimates we
can identify endogenous social interactions based on within village variation in the individual
schooling, peer group schooling, and peer group composition. This is impossible with the ”IV1”
strategy since the program status of a village Ti does not vary within villages. Nevertheless, it is
crucial to understand whether identiﬁcation is driven by diﬀerences across villages rather than
within villages since the program might be run very diﬀerently between villages. Note, however,
that within village variation in peer group composition and average peer group schooling is
quite small leading to imprecise estimates. We therefore report baseline estimates that use
within state variation and report estimates that use within village variation as a sensitivity
analysis.
4.2 Identifying the Direct Eﬀect of PROGRESA
The second aim of the empirical analysis is to identify the direct eﬀect of the PROGRESA
transfer. This can be achieved by estimating equation (1) instrumenting the endogenous re-
gressor Sig with the program status of the village and with the program status of the village
interacted with the eligible fraction in the peer group (IV2). This identiﬁcation strategy is
potentially problematic if there is a heterogeneous response of the eligible children that is
correlated with the eligible fraction in the peer group.
Interestingly, there is a second strategy that measures the direct eﬀect of PROGRESA
on eligible children that does not suﬀer from this potential problem. This strategy estimates
equation (1) using within peer group information on poverty status of a child. The basic idea
of this strategy is that adding peer group ﬁxed eﬀects controls for the social eﬀect (γ ∗ Sig).
Any diﬀerences in school attendance between eligible and ineligible children in villages with
program can thus be attributed to the cash transfers. Moreover, this ”within peer group”
strategy does not require that the eligible fraction is orthogonal to eﬀect heterogeneity. Note,
however, that the resulting estimate of the direct eﬀect of the subsidy is downward biased
17since the social environment of a child, Sig, is not constant within peer groups. Speciﬁcally,
there is a below average social eﬀect on poor children and an above average social eﬀect on
non-poor children leading to a negative correlation between the group ﬁxed eﬀect error term
and the interaction term Ti∗Pi that identiﬁes the direct eﬀect of the cash subsidy. This means
that the within peer group estimator identiﬁes a lower bound on the true direct eﬀect of the
policy. Nevertheless, it is important to consider a second estimate of the direct eﬀect of the
cash subsidy on poor children to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings.
Information on the direct eﬀect of PROGRESA and on the importance of social interactions
can be combined to decompose the total eﬀect of the program on eligible children (Table 3,
Column A). The total eﬀect is
E[Si|Ti = 1,Pi = 1] − E[Si|Ti = 0,Pi = 1] = (3)
= δ + γ ∗ (E[Sig|Ti = 1,Pi = 1] − E[Sig|Ti = 0,Pi = 1])
This contrast therefore captures both, the direct eﬀect of PROGRESA that is due to
transfers as well as the social eﬀect of PROGRESA that arises because the program changes
the average change in school attendance of other children in the same grade and gender cell.
Thus, comparing the direct eﬀect of PROGRESA with the contrast (3) is informative on the
relative importance of the individual and social determinants of school attendance decisions.
Moreover, equation (3) also highlights why information on the relevance of social interactions
– the parameter γ – is important for policy design. Granting access to the transfer for only one
household in each village will generate the eﬀect δ among eligible children. In contrast, granting
access to the program to an increasing number of households within the village generates an
additional social eﬀect via the change in the social environment Sig combined with the relevance
of social interactions.
5 Results
5.1 Main Result on Social Interactions
Table 4 reports the main results of the empirical analysis.24 The ﬁrst Column in Table 4
provides the reduced form estimate for the IV1 strategy – the treatment contrast of the trend
24Note that all estimates control for the full set of control variables shown in Table 3. Inference is based
on robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the village level. The analysis is conﬁned to the 5,143
children for whom we ﬁnd at least one other classmate within the village.
18in school attendance among the non-poor children with at leat one child in their peer group.25
The analysis indicates that school attendance drops by 2.1 percentage points less strongly
among non-poor children. This eﬀect is identical to the eﬀect reported in the universe of all
non-poor children (Table 3, Panel B).26
Table 4 about here
The second column in Table 4 reports the eﬀect of PROGRESA on peer group average
change in school attendance. The cash transfer increases the trend in school attendance among
peers by 3.9 percentage points. This eﬀect ist statistically signiﬁcant and quantitatively im-
portant. Taken together, the evidence in Table 4 suggests that a change by 3.9 percentage
points in peer’s school attendance trend generates a 2.1 percentage points increase in ineligible
students’ school attendance trend.
The IV1 strategy in Column 3 of Table 4 combines the reduced form estimate and the eﬀect
of PROGRESA on the average change in school attendance to estimate the social interactions
parameter γ. Results indicate the marginal eﬀect of peer group schooling on individual school-
ing of the ineligible student, γ, is .534. The parameter estimate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 5 % level. The parameter estimate thus indicates that social interactions among
students are important.
Yet the IV1 strategy merely compares students in treated villages to other students in
villages who do not have access to the program while disregarding the eligibility structure
of the peer group. A more reﬁned identiﬁcation strategy distinguishes peer groups with low
eligible fraction from peer groups with high eligible fraction. To the extent that the eﬀect is
driven by a process at the peer group level, we should see a weak spillover among ineligible
students whose peer group contains a low eligible fraction and a strong spillover eﬀect among
ineligible students whose peer group contains a high eligible fraction.
Figure 1 investigates the spillover eﬀect among non-poor children conditional on the eligible
fraction in the peer group. Speciﬁcally, in preparing the evidence in Figure 1 we regress the
change in school attendance Si among ineligible children on the eligible fraction in the peer
group Pig (excluding individual i), separately for children living in villages with the program
and for children in villages without the program.27 Figure 1 shows the diﬀerence in the two
resulting regression. Clearly, individual school attendance appears to increase as the eligible
25There are 16 children with an empty peer group (living in small villages). The average peer group consists
of 12.55 children, with 10 % of all children having a peer group smaller or equal to 4 children and 90 % of all
children having a peer group that is smaller or equal to 24 children (standard deviation 9.27).
26This suggests that limiting the sample to those children with a non-empty reference group does not signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀect results.
27The non-parametric kernel regressions use an Epanechikov kernel with bandwidth of .5.
19fraction in the peer group increases. For instance, an ineligible child with fewer than 1 out of
5 eligible peers is not shown to experience a diﬀerent change in school attendance in a treated
village compared to the control village. However, when more than 4 out of 5 peers are eligible
for the school subsidy, ineligible children appear to be going to school much more likely in
treated villages than in control villages. This shows that the spillover eﬀect of the program on
ineligible children arises for children with many eligible peers.
Figure 1 about here
The evidence in Figure 1 motivates using the interaction term between the eligible fraction
in the peer group and the treatment status of the village and the treatment status of the village
as an instrument for peer group average schooling. The fourth Column in Table 4 reports the
result of the IV2 analysis that uses the treatment status of the village interacted with the
eligible fraction as an instrument. Note that the IV2 regression adds the eligible fraction in
the peer group to the list of control variables. Results indicate that the average trend in school
attendance in the peer group signiﬁcantly aﬀects the trend in individual school attendance.
These results suggest that a 2 percentage points change in the trend in school attendance in
the peer group leads to a 1 percentage point change of schooling trends at the individual level.
Moreover, IV2 estimates are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1 % level rather
than at the 5 % level. We therefore apply the IV2 strategy to identify social interactions.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis on Social Interactions
Table 5 discusses three important concerns with the identiﬁcation strategy. Column A in Table
5 reproduces the baseline result from Table 4 for convenience (Table 4 Column 4).
Column B in Table 5 addresses the concern that PROGRESA grants increase income of
poor families considerably. These additional resources could spill over to non-poor families in
at least two ways. First, eligible families might share the resources directly with other families
they know within the village. Adato (2000) does not ﬁnd evidence for such direct sharing of
resources. Second, the program may also have increases consumption of the non-poor indi-
rectly. We investigate this concern by controlling for monthly per adult equivalent household
consumption using the food and non-food expenditure measures derived by Angelucci and
De Giorgi (2006).28 This expenditure measure is available for 4847 out of the total 5143 chil-
dren in the sample due to non-response to consumption questions. When we add total food
28Descriptive analysis of the total food and non-food expenditures show that the non-poor spend more (193
Pesos) than the poor (154 Pesos). Moreover, consistent with the expected program impacts, we ﬁnd that the
poor in treated villages consume more (158 Pesos) than the poor in control villages (147 Pesos). Yet, the
non-poor in treated villages consume slightly less (192 Pesos) than the non-poor in control villages (194 Pesos).
20and non-food expenditure to the main analysis, we ﬁnd that consumption is an important pre-
dictor of school attendance trends. Households with higher consumption also see their children
leaving school to a lesser extent. However, adding total expenditure to the regression does not
aﬀect the result concerning the social interactions parameter. This parameter remains vir-
tually unchanged suggesting that there is a one percentage point change in individual school
attendance as a response to every 2 percentage point increase in peer group school attendance.
Table 5 about here
Column C investigates the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to village speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in
school attendance trends. Such eﬀects could arise due to the PROGRESA program being
run diﬀerently in villages with many eligible households compared to villages with only a few
eligible households. Moreover, there could also be diﬀerences in local labor market trends
across treated and control communities invalidating our identiﬁcation strategy. We therefore
add a ﬁxed eﬀect for every village in the dataset. Results indicate that the point estimate of
the social interactions parameter is about .595 which is very similar to the baseline estimate of
.546. This shows that the social interactions parameter point estimate is very robust to local
heterogeneity in villages. On the other hand, controlling for village ﬁxed eﬀects appears to
remove too much of the identifying variation leading to a large standard error of .798. Thus,
the within-village estimate of the social interactions parameter is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. Column D checks whether adding some variation increases the precision of the
estimates. The estimates in Column D identify endogenous social interactions within 191
local regions (”municipalidad”). Results indicate that the social interactions parameter is
.560 (with standard error .274) which is identical to baseline parameter estimate of the social
interactions parameter of .546. The within region endogenous social interactions estimate is
clearly statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.29
So far the empirical analysis has assumed that the social interactions parameter γ is iden-
tical across individuals. This assumption motivates a standard constant coeﬃcient regression
model for identiﬁcation. Table 6 explores the extent to which this assumption is true along
the two important dimensions gender and grade level. Panel A in Table 6 reports the social
interactions coeﬃcient by completed grade level. Results indicate that social interactions are
29We have also performed a variety of additional sensitivity analyses (results not shown but available upon
request from the corresponding author). The ﬁrst analysis excludes children at the poverty threshold ﬁnding a
social interactions parameter of .596 with standard error .249. The second analysis weights ineligible children
with the inverse of the probability of being in the sample ﬁnding a social interactions parameter of .520 with
standard error .309. The third restricts the sample to children on grade level ﬁnding a social interactions
parameter of .554 with standard error of .229. Thus, all the analyses suggest that endogenous social interactions
are economically important and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 % level.
21signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and almost equally important for children in primary school
(grade level 3-4) and children transiting from primary school to secondary school (grade level
5-6). This ﬁnding is important in the sense that social interactions not only aﬀect the drop
out decision (captured in grades 5 and 6) but also the regular attendance decision (captured
in grades 3 and 4).
Table 6 about here
Gender is a second important dimension for two reasons. First, the labor market oppor-
tunities are expected to diﬀer strongly between boys and girls. Second, the secondary school
PROGRESA transfer is higher for girls than for boys. Panel B in Table 6 therefore provides
separate results for girls and for boys. Results for girls suggest that the social interactions
parameter point estimate is slightly lower than in the baseline estimate but it is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Results for boys are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and slightly larger
than the baseline estimate. Thus, results by gender do not suggest any important diﬀerences
in the extent to which social forces aﬀect human capital decisions.
In sum, the results in Table 5 and Table 6 are consistent with a strong, robust, and universal
importance of social forces in individual schooling decisions.
5.3 The Direct Eﬀect of PROGRESA
Table 7 reports the two diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the direct eﬀect of PROGRESA
transfers. Column A shows results that instrument the endogenous average school participation
according to the IV2 strategy. Column B shows results based on the within peer group approach
(section 4).
Table 7 about here
The results of the IV2 diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis indicate that the ﬁnancial transfers
due to PROGRESA lead to a 3.2 percentage points increase in the school attendance trend
between October 1997 and October 1998. Moreover, the social interactions parameter is .513
which is almost identical to the baseline estimate. There appears to be no signiﬁcant eﬀect of
the poverty status of the individual on school attendance. The results from the within peer
group estimates indicate that the direct eﬀect of the program on eligible children is at least
3.0 percentage points. Thus, the direct eﬀect of the program on eligible children appears to be
robustly identiﬁed from the IV2 estimates.
It is now possible to decompose the total eﬀect of PROGRESA on children who live in
eligible families into a direct eﬀect that arises due to the ﬁnancial incentive and an indirect
22eﬀect arising due to the eﬀect of PROGRESA on the social environment of the children (Table
8).
Table 8 about here
The direct eﬀect of the program on eligible children is on the order of 3.2 percentage
points. The indirect eﬀect is the product of the social interactions parameter (.513) with
the peer group response to PROGRESA. The peer group response to PROGRESA can be
identiﬁed contrasting average school attendance in treated and control villages (conditional
on all control variables). It turns out that PROGRESA led to an increase in peer group
average school attendance of about 4.8 percentage points. Thus, the total predicted eﬀect
of the PROGRESA program on eligible children is 5.7 percentage points. This shows that
the direct eﬀect of the monetary transfer due to PROGRESA is roughly of equal size as the
indirect eﬀect of PROGRESA via the change in peer group decisions.
Moreover, Table 8 shows that the indirect eﬀect of PROGRESA is larger for eligible chil-
dren than for ineligible children. This is due to the fact that the typical peer group of an
eligible child is treated at a much larger rate than the typical peer group of an ineligible child
leading to a stronger peer group impact of PROGRESA for eligible children. This highlights
the main contribution of our results to the literature concerned with targeted interventions.30
If social interactions are relevant, targeting is an important determinant of the average eﬀect
of the program among eligible individuals. Thus, a program that reaches the same number of
individuals will generate a diﬀerent eﬀect on treated individuals when spread out over individ-
uals who are not connected to each other compared with a strategy of strong concentration of
the program within tightly deﬁned groups rather than individuals.
5.4 Is there Evidence for Social Learning Interactions?
The existing evidence suggests that the decision to stay in school is very strongly aﬀected
by the corresponding choices in the peer group in rural Mexico. Moreover, such endogenous
social interactions are economically important accounting for nearly one half of the overall
eﬀect of PROGRESA on eligible children. It is thus crucial to understand the reasons for such
interactions. There are at least two possible explanations. First, children may conform to
average choices of their classmates because they like spending time with them – a preference
interaction. Second, parents could learn from other parents about the abilities of their children.
Interestingly, oﬃcial PROGRESA data allows investigating whether this social learning
explanation has any explanatory power or not. In October 1998, parents were asked
30See Behrman et al. (1999) on a discussion of targeting issues in the PROGRESA context.
23”What level of schooling do you believe your child is able to reach?”
for each child that is attending school in October 1998. Literally, this survey item intends
to capture parents’ perceptions of children’s ability to succeed at school.31 However, it is also
possible that the responses to this survey item are aﬀected by what level of schooling parents
want their child to reach.
Figure 2 displays the answers to this question, separately for eligible children and ineligible
children, and by village program status.
Figure 2 about here
Introducing PROGRESA leads to a more favorable perception of the ability of children
living in eligible households (subﬁgure A). The proportion of parents stating that their child
can reach the post secondary school level is 29.4 % in villages without the program but 34.1
% in villages with program. There is also a slightly higher proportion stating that their child
is able to succeed in secondary school 55.6 % in villages with PROGRESA compared to 54.3
% in villages without PROGRESA.
Results for ineligible children indicate that – on average – parents from ineligible families
are more optimistic regarding the cognitive abilities of their children (subﬁgure B). Whereas
only 32.5 percent of all eligible families believe that their child is able to succeed at post
secondary level, about 40.6 percent of eligible households believe that their child is up to the
challenge. Surprisingly, introducing the program in the local village also seems to improve
ineligible parents’ perception of their child’s ability . The proportion stating that their child
can succeed at the post-secondary level is 43.0 % in villages with the program compared to
37.0 % in villages without PROGRESA. In contrast to the eligible families, the increase in the
upper end of the ability distribution is accompanied by both a reduction of the proportion of
parents thinking their child can succeed at the primary school and the secondary school level.
Are these results signiﬁcant? Table 9 displays the results of a set of linear probability
regressions for the event that the child succeeds at the secondary school level (Columns 1 and
3) and for the event that the child succeeds at the post secondary level (Columns 2 and 4).32
Table 9 about here
Results for eligible and ineligible children show that the increase at the top end of the ability
distribution is statistically signiﬁcant from zero. Both, eligible parents and ineligible parents’
31In Spanish, this item reads ¿Hasta qu´ e grado cree que podr´ ıa llegar [su hija / su hijo]?, item r049 in survey
wave October 1998.
32These results can also be obtained using an ordered probit model for the level of schooling parents believe
that their child can reach. Results are identical to those reported in Table 9.
24perception of their child’s ability to succeed at the post secondary level increases statistically
signiﬁcantly and on the order of 5 to 6 percentage points. The eﬀects of PROGRESA in the
middle of the ability distribution do not appear to be statistically signiﬁcant.
These results admit two interesting conclusions. First, the results for eligible children
suggests that the cash subsidy program not only frees up household resources allowing poor
families to send children to school but it also increases parents’ subjective evaluations of their
child’s ability. Sending your child to school can improve your subjective evaluation of that
child’s ability because the child studies more or because you acquire more information on the
child’s true ability. Second, the results for ineligible children suggest that parents’ evaluations
of their child’s ability increase one for one when eligible parents’ perception of child ability
increases. This is indeed consistent with relative evaluation of a child’s ability.
Taken together, we have shown that the endogenous social interaction eﬀects may arise
in the PROGRESA setting because the program improves eligible parents perception of child
quality. Because subjective evaluations of a child’s ability is relative the program-induced
increase in the perception of eligible children’s ability also leads to improved evaluation of
ineligible children. Thus, ineligible parents are more likely to send their children to school
because they feel their child can succeed at higher levels. This line of reasoning suggests that
there is at least some scope for alternative policy measures that target parent perceptions
of child ability to improve schooling outcomes in rural Mexico. This is an important result
because if the endogenous social interactions in schooling were purely a result of preference
interactions, such a policy would not have an eﬀect.
Note that there is an important limitation of this analysis. Parent perceptions are only
available for children attending school, the responses to this question are selective. However,
since the program increases school attendance and since parents send the most able children to
school, the eﬀect of the program on perceptions estimated in the selective sub-sample is likely
to be a lower bound on the shift in the population distribution of parents perceptions.
6 Conclusions
This paper argues that individual schooling decisions and peer group schooling decisions may
be related in important ways for at least two reasons. First, students may conform to the
choices in their peer group because they expect to be popular with them. Second, students
and their parents may learn from the choices of other, similar students. The relevance of the
resulting social interactions can be studied in the context of an experiment that grants a cash
subsidy to a subgroup of students in villages across rural Mexico. This subsidy encourages the
25eligible students to remain in school. Moreover, if social interactions are relevant, the ineligible
students may also decide to acquire more schooling provided that a salient fraction of their
peer are eligible for the subsidy.
Results indicate ﬁrst that there is a positive average eﬀect of the program on ineligible
individuals. We also ﬁnd that the ineligible students’ response to the school subsidy is larger
the larger is the eligible fraction of students in the peer group – the students in the same
grade living in the same village. Second, when we combine the response of the ineligible
student with information on the eﬀect of PROGRESA on peer group schooling, we ﬁnd that
the ineligible students’ schooling decisions are strongly, and statistically signiﬁcantly, aﬀected
by their peer’s decision. Third, we also identify the eﬀect of the cash subsidy program on
the eligible students. Comparing this direct eﬀect of the program with the indirect eﬀect of
the program, we ﬁnd that both are equally relevant among eligible children. Fourth, data on
parents subjective evaluation of their children’s ability indicates that both, eligible families and
ineligible families subjective evaluation of the quality of their children is more favorable when
the program is introduced. This suggests that endogenous social interactions arise because
parents’ perceptions of child quality are aﬀected by other parents’ evaluation of the quality of
their children – evaluations are relative.
These ﬁndings are important for education policy. Strong social interactions in schooling
decisions imply that the targeting of the program matters for the average eﬀect of the program
on the eligible students. Moreover, because social interactions arise to some extent due to
changes in parents subjective evaluation of the ability of their children, alternative school
attendance programs could focus on informing parents about the ability of their children.
26References
Adato, M. (2000). The Impact of PROGRESA on Community Social Relationships. Report,
IFPRI.
Adato, M., Coady, D., and Ruel, M. (2000). An operations evaluation of PROGRESA from the
perspective of beneﬁciaries, promotoras, school directors, and health staﬀ. Report, IFPRI.
Akerlof, G. A. and Kranton, R. E. (2002). Identity and Schooling: Some Lessons for the
Economics of Education. Journal of Economic Literature, 150(December 2002), 1167–1201.
Angelucci, M. and De Giorgi, G. (2006). Indirect Eﬀects of an Aid Program: The Case of
Progresa and Consumption. Discussion paper no. 1955, IZA.
Angrist, J. D. and Lang, K. (2004). Does School Integration Generate Peer Eﬀects? Evidence
from Boston’s Metco Program. American Economic Review, 94(5), 1613–1634.
Attanasio, O., Meghir, C., and Szekely, M. (2003). Using Randomised Experiments And
Structural Models For ’Scaling Up’: Evidence From The PROGRESA Evaluation. Working
paper no ewp03/05, Edepo.
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special
Reference to Education. NY: Columbia University Press.
Behrman, J. R., Davis, B., and Skouﬁas, E. (1999). An Evaluation of the Selection of Ben-
eﬁciary Households in the Education, Health, and Nutrition Program (PROGRESA) of
Mexico. Report, IFPRI.
Behrman, J. R., Sengupta, P., and Todd, P. E. (2001). Progressing through PROGRESA:
An Impact Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment. Working paper, University of
Pennsylvania.
Betts, J. R. and Zau, A. (2004). Peer Groups and Academic Achievement: Panel Evidence
from Administrative Data. Working paper, University of California.
Bobonis, G. J. (2004). Income Transfers, Marital Dissolution and Intra-Household Resource
Allocation: Evidence from Rural Mexico. Working paper, University of California at Berke-
ley.
Bobonis, G. J. and Finan, F. S. (2005). Endoenous Peer Eﬀects in School Participation.
Working paper, UC at Berkeley.
27Buddelmeyer, H. and Skouﬁas, E. (2003). An Evaluation of the Performance of Regression
Discontinuity Design on PROGRESA. Working paper, University of Melbourne.
Card, D. (1999). The Causal Eﬀect of Education on Earnings. In O. Ashenfelter and D. Card,
editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, pages 1801– 1863. North-Holland.
Case, A. C. and Katz, L. F. (1991). The Company You Keep: The Eﬀect of Family and
Neighborhood on Disadvantaged Youth. Working paper 3708, NBER.
Coleman, J. S. (1961). The Adolescent Society: The Social Life of the Teenagers and Its Impact
on Education. NY: The Free Press.
Duﬂo, E. and Saez, E. (2003). The Role of Information and Social Interactions in Retirement
Plan Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
118(3), 815–842.
Gertler, P. (2000). The Impact of Progresa on Health. Final Report, IFPRI.
Gertler, P. (2004). Do Conditional Cash Transfers Improve Child Health? Evidence from
PROGRESA’s Control Randomized Experiment. American Economic Review, 94(2), 336–
341.
Glaeser, E. L., Sacerdote, B., and Scheinkman, J. A. (1996). Crime and Social Interactions.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(2), 507–548.
Glaeser, E. L., Sacerdote, B., and Scheinkman, J. A. (2003). The Social Multiplier. Journal
of the European Economic Association, 1(1-2), 345–353.
Hanson, G. E. (2002). Education and Educational Attainment in Mexico. Working paper,
World Bank.
Hanushek, E. A., Kain, J. F., Markman, J. M., and Rivkin, S. G. (2001). Does Peer Ability
Aﬀect Student Achievement. Working paper 8502, NBER.
Hoxby, C. (2000). Peer Eﬀects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race Variation.
Working paper 7867, NBER.
Lalive, R. (2003). Social Interactions in Unemployment. Discussion paper 803, IZA.
Manski, C. F. (1993). Identiﬁcation of Endogenous Social Interactions: The Reﬂection Prob-
lem. Review of Economic Studies, 60(3), 531–542.
28Manski, C. F. (1995). Identiﬁcation Problems in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Manski, C. F. (2000). Economic Analysis of Social Interactions. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 14(3), 115–136.
Manski, C. F. (2004). Social Learning from Private Experiences: The Dynamics of the Selection
Problem. Review of Economic Studies, 71(2), 443–458.
Miguel, E. and Kremer, M. (2004). Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in
the Presence of Treatment Externalities. Econometrica, 72(1), 159–217.
Miguel, E., Kremer, M., and Thornton, R. (2004). Incentives to Learn. Working paper, Harvard
University.
Moﬃtt, R. A. (2001). Policy Interventions, Low Level Equilibria, and Social Interactions.
In S. N. Durlauf and H. P. Young, editors, Social Dynamics, pages 45–82. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Munshi, K. and Myaux, J. (2006). Social Norms and the Fertility Transition. Journal of
Development Economics, page forthcoming.
OECD (2004). Education at a Glance 2004 – Mexico. Paris: OECD.
Sacerdote, B. (2001). Peer Eﬀects with Random Assignment. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
116(2), 681–704.
Skouﬁas, E. (2001). PROGRESA and its Impacts on the Human Capital and Welfare of
Households in Rural Mexico: A Synthesis of the Results of an Evaluation by IFPRI. Report,
IFPRI.
Topa, G. (2001). Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment. Review of Economic
Studies, 68(2), 261–295.
Topa, G. and Conley, T. G. (2002). Socio-Economic Distance and Spatial Patterns in Unem-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mVillage with PROGRESA No Yes Difference No Yes Difference
(abs. z-Value) (abs. z-Value)
Completed grade 4 0.246 0.235 -0.011 0.227 0.218 -0.009
(1.25) (0.78)
Completed grade 5 0.224 0.212 -0.012 0.227 0.239 0.013
(1.45) (0.99)
Completed grade 6 0.272 0.282 0.010 0.337 0.337 0.000
(0.87) (0.01)
Girl 0.502 0.492 -0.010 0.497 0.507 0.010
(0.87) (0.65)
Mother Ed.: Primary School or Higher 0.163 0.160 -0.003 0.217 0.218 0.002
(0.19) (0.07)
Father Ed.: Primary School or Higher 0.165 0.169 0.004 0.192 0.202 0.011
(0.22) (0.50)
Father Information Missing 0.099 0.095 -0.004 0.117 0.119 0.001
(0.41) (0.13)
Floor: Cement 0.262 0.288 0.026 0.626 0.598 -0.027
(0.92) (0.86)
Roof: Tin 0.263 0.286 0.023 0.315 0.304 -0.011
(0.78) (0.30)
Roof: Asbest 0.129 0.131 0.002 0.167 0.163 -0.004
(0.11) (0.12)
Roof: Tiles 0.093 0.127 0.034 0.084 0.092 0.008
(1.32) (0.39)
Roof: Cement Blocks 0.106 0.086 -0.020 0.241 0.251 0.010
(1.15) (0.31)
Secondary School in Village 0.260 0.256 -0.004 0.340 0.265 -0.075
(0.07) (1.15)
Observations 3880 6604 2083 3086
Notes:
Source: Own Calculation, Based on Progresa Evaluation Data.
Eligible means household is classified as poor. Mothers in eligible households receive a cash grant for each child attending 
school more than 85 % of each quarter in grades 3 to 6 of primary school and grades 1 to 3 of secondary school. All 
characteristics are measured in October 1997, i.e. abouth 8 months before PROGRESA started. Sample refers to children 
who have completed grades 3 to 6 of primary school who are living with their mother.
A. Eligible B. Ineligible
Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics: 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eA. Eligible B. Ineligible
Village with PROGRESA 0.058 0.021
(0.010)*** (0.012)*
Completed grade 4 -0.018 -0.017
(0.007)** (0.012)
Completed grade 5 -0.185 -0.176
(0.014)*** (0.017)***




Mother Ed.: Primary School or Higher 0.003 0.013
(0.010) (0.011)
Father Ed.: Primary School or Higher 0.015 0.033
(0.010) (0.013)**
Father Information Missing -0.043 -0.022
(0.014)*** (0.015)
Floor: Cement -0.000 0.004
(0.010) (0.013)
Roof: Tin 0.005 0.018
(0.011) (0.017)
Roof: Asbest 0.015 0.032
(0.014) (0.020)
Roof: Tiles 0.005 0.036
(0.017) (0.024)
Roof: Cement Blocks 0.003 0.026
(0.015) (0.018)




State Effects (7) Yes Yes
Observations 10484 5169
Notes:
Source: Own Calculation, Based on Progresa Evaluation Data.
The Effect of PROGRESA Transfers on Poor and Non-Poor Children
Dependent Variable: Change in School Attendance 1998-1997
Table 3:
Robust standard errors in parentheses (allow for clustering at village level). * 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































:A. IV2 B. Within Peer Group
Village with PROGRESA * Poor 0.032 0.030
(0.015)** (0.014)**




Control Variables Yes Yes
State Effects (7) Yes No
Peer Group Effects (1882) No Yes
Observations 15574 15574
Notes:
See Table 3 for a list of all control variables. 
Change in Peer Group School Attendance instrumented (IV2).
Source: Own Calculation, Based on Progresa Evaluation Data.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (allow for clustering at village level). * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Measuring Direct and  Social Interaction Effects of PROGRESA
Dependent Variable: Change in School Attendance
Sample: Eligible and Ineligible Children
Table 7:A. Eligible B. Ineligible
I. Direct Effect of Cash Grant 0.032 0.000
(0.015)** -
II. Social Interactions Parameter 0.513 0.513
(0.246)** (0.246)**
III. Effect of Cash Grant on Peer Group  0.048 0.039
(0.009)*** (0.010)***
IV. Implied Social Interactions Effect (II*III) 0.025 0.020
(0.011)* (0.013)*
V. Total (I+IV) 0.057 0.020
(0.019)*** (0.013)*
Notes: 
Source: Own Calculation, Based on Progresa Evaluation Data.
I and II taken from Table 7, IIIA taken from a regression of peer group average 
schooling on "village with PROGRESA" and controls, IIIB taken from Table 4. 
Standard errors for IV and V calculated using delta method.
Comparing Direct and  Indirect Effects of PROGRESA


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































nA. Girl B. Boy
Primary School
37 0 7 0
48 0 8 0






Source: Table 1 in Behrman, Sengupta, Todd (2001)
Table A1:
PROGRESA cash subsidy in August-December 1998, per childCESifo Working Paper Series 




1724 Axel Dreher and Jan-Egbert Sturm, Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the 
UN General Assembly?, May 2006 
 
1725 Swapan K. Bhattacharya and Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Prospects of Regional 
Cooperation in Trade, Investment and Finance in Asia: An Empirical Analysis on 
BIMSTEC Countries and Japan, May 2006 
 
1726 Philippe Choné and Laurent Linnemer, Assessing Horizontal Mergers under Uncertain 
Efficiency Gains, May 2006 
 
1727 Daniel Houser and Thomas Stratmann, Selling Favors in the Lab: Experiments on 
Campaign Finance Reform, May 2006 
 
1728 E. Maarten Bosker, Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Marc Schramm, A Century 
of Shocks: The Evolution of the German City Size Distribution 1925 – 1999, May 2006 
 
1729 Clive Bell and Hans Gersbach, Growth and Enduring Epidemic Diseases, May 2006 
 
1730 W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete 
Contracts, May 2006 
 
1731 Jan K. Brueckner and Ricardo Flores-Fillol, Airline Schedule Competition: Product-
Quality Choice in a Duopoly Model, May 2006 
 
1732 Kerstin Bernoth and Guntram B. Wolff, Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal 
Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia, May 2006 
 
1733 Emmanuelle Auriol and Pierre M. Picard, Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting 
with Private Monopoly, May 2006 
 
1734 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Modelling Structural Breaks in the 
US, UK and Japanese Unemployment Rates, May 2006 
 
1735 Emily J. Blanchard, Reevaluating the Role of Trade Agreements: Does Investment 
Globalization Make the WTO Obsolete?, May 2006 
 
1736 Per Engström and Bertil Holmlund, Tax Evasion and Self-Employment in a High-Tax 
Country: Evidence from Sweden, May 2006 
 
1737 Erkki Koskela and Mikko Puhakka, Cycles and Indeterminacy in Overlapping 
Generations Economies with Stone-Geary Preferences, May 2006 
 
1738 Saku Aura and Thomas Davidoff, Supply Constraints and Housing Prices, May 2006 
 
  
1739 Balázs Égert and Ronald MacDonald, Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Transition 
Economies: Surveying the Surveyable, June 2006 
 
1740 Ben J. Heijdra and Ward E. Romp, Ageing and Growth in the Small Open Economy, 
June 2006 
 
1741 Robert Fenge and Volker Meier, Subsidies for Wages and Infrastructure: How to 
Restrain Undesired Immigration, June 2006 
 
1742 Robert S. Chirinko and Debdulal Mallick, The Elasticity of Derived Demand, Factor 
Substitution and Product Demand: Corrections to Hicks’ Formula and Marshall’s Four 
Rules, June 2006 
 
1743 Harry P. Bowen, Haris Munandar and Jean-Marie Viaene, Evidence and Implications of 
Zipf’s Law for Integrated Economies, June 2006 
 
1744 Markku Lanne and Helmut Luetkepohl, Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks via 
Changes in Volatility, June 2006 
 
1745 Timo Trimborn, Karl-Josef Koch and Thomas M. Steger, Multi-Dimensional 
Transitional Dynamics: A Simple Numberical Procedure, June 2006 
 
1746 Vivek H. Dehejia and Yiagadeesen Samy, Labor Standards and Economic Integration in 
the European Union: An Empirical Analysis, June 2006 
 
1747 Carlo Altavilla and Paul De Grauwe, Forecasting and Combining Competing Models of 
Exchange Rate Determination, June 2006 
 
1748 Olaf Posch and Klaus Waelde, Natural Volatility, Welfare and Taxation, June 2006 
 
1749 Christian Holzner, Volker Meier and Martin Werding, Workfare, Monitoring, and 
Efficiency Wages, June 2006 
 
1750 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Agglomeration and Aid, 
June 2006 
 
1751 Robert Fenge and Jakob von Weizsäcker, Mixing Bismarck and Child Pension Systems: 
An Optimum Taxation Approach, June 2006 
 
1752 Helge Berger and Michael Neugart, Labor Courts, Nomination Bias, and 
Unemployment in Germany, June 2006 
 
1753 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, A 
Collective Household Model of Time Allocation - a Comparison of Native Dutch and 
Immigrant Households in the Netherlands, June 2006 
 
1754 Marko Koethenbuerger, Ex-Post Redistribution in a Federation: Implications for 
Corrective Policy, July 2006 
 
  
1755 Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm and Heinrich Ursprung, The Impact of Globalization on 
the Composition of Government Expenditures: Evidence from Panel Data, July 2006 
 
1756 Richard Schmidtke, Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good, July 2006 
 
1757 J. Atsu Amegashie, Intentions and Social Interactions, July 2006 
 
1758 Alessandro Balestrino, Tax Avoidance, Endogenous Social Norms, and the Comparison 
Income Effect, July 2006 
 
1759 Øystein Thøgersen, Intergenerational Risk Sharing by Means of Pay-as-you-go 
Programs – an Investigation of Alternative Mechanisms, July 2006 
 
1760 Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Alan D. Woodland, Steepest Ascent Tariff Reforms, 
July 2006 
 
1761 Ronald MacDonald and Cezary Wojcik, Catching-up, Inflation Differentials and Credit 
Booms in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union: Some Implications for EMU and new EU 
Member States, July 2006 
 
1762 Robert Dur, Status-Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-
Tolerance, July 2006 
 
1763 Christa Hainz, Business Groups in Emerging Markets – Financial Control and 
Sequential Investment, July 2006 
 
1764 Didier Laussel and Raymond Riezman, Fixed Transport Costs and International Trade, 
July 2006 
 
1765 Rafael Lalive, How do Extended Benefits Affect Unemployment Duration? A 
Regression Discontinuity Approach, July 2006 
 
1766 Eric Hillebrand, Gunther Schnabl and Yasemin Ulu, Japanese Foreign Exchange 
Intervention and the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate: A Simultaneous Equations Approach 
Using Realized Volatility, July 2006 
 
1767 Carsten Hefeker, EMU Enlargement, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms, July 
2006 
 
1768 Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda, Individual Attitudes towards Immigrants: 
Welfare-State Determinants across Countries, July 2006 
 
1769 Maarten Bosker and Harry Garretsen, Geography Rules Too! Economic Development 
and the Geography of Institutions, July 2006 
 
1770 M. Hashem Pesaran and Allan Timmermann, Testing Dependence among Serially 
Correlated Multi-category Variables, July 2006 
 
1771 Juergen von Hagen and Haiping Zhang, Financial Liberalization in a Small Open 
Economy, August 2006  
1772 Alessandro Cigno, Is there a Social Security Tax Wedge?, August 2006 
 
1773 Peter Egger, Simon Loretz, Michael Pfaffermayr and Hannes Winner, Corporate 
Taxation and Multinational Activity, August 2006 
 
1774 Jeremy S.S. Edwards, Wolfgang Eggert and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, The Measurement 
of Firm Ownership and its Effect on Managerial Pay, August 2006 
 
1775 Scott Alan Carson and Thomas N. Maloney, Living Standards in Black and White: 
Evidence from the Heights of Ohio Prison Inmates, 1829 – 1913, August 2006 
 
1776 Richard Schmidtke, Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities, 
August 2006 
 
1777 Ben J. Heijdra and Jenny E. Ligthart, The Transitional Dynamics of Fiscal Policy in 
Small Open Economies, August 2006 
 
1778 Jay Pil Choi, How Reasonable is the ‘Reasonable’ Royalty Rate? Damage Rules and 
Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights, August 2006 
 
1779 Ludger Woessmann, Efficiency and Equity of European Education and Training 
Policies, August 2006 
 
1780 Gregory Ponthiere, Growth, Longevity and Public Policy, August 2006 
 
1781 Laszlo Goerke, Corporate and Personal Income Tax Declarations, August 2006 
 
1782 Florian Englmaier, Pablo Guillén, Loreto Llorente, Sander Onderstal and Rupert 
Sausgruber, The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit 
Auctions, August 2006 
 
1783 Adam S. Posen and Daniel Popov Gould, Has EMU had any Impact on the Degree of 
Wage Restraint?, August 2006 
 
1784 Paolo M. Panteghini, A Simple Explanation for the Unfavorable Tax Treatment of 
Investment Costs, August 2006 
 
1785 Alan J. Auerbach, Why have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined? Another Look, August 
2006 
 
1786 Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita, Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the 
Holdup Problem, August 2006 
 
1787 Rafael Lalive and Alejandra Cattaneo, Social Interactions and Schooling Decisions, 
August 2006 